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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(Supp.
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
matter.

This appeal is taken from a final Order and Judgment

rendered by the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County,
State of Utah, following a bench trial held pursuant to
stipulation on written pleadings and evidence, which wrongfully
denied Motor Cargo an excess premium credit of $56,931.00.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a

matter of law that the Retrospective Premium Determination
Agreement - Plan III was clear and unambiguous in that it
denied appellant Motor Cargo an excess premium refund?
2.

Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a

matter of law that the denial of appellant Motor Cargo's right
to receive an excess premium refund under the Retrospective
Premium Determination Agreement - Plan III did not constitute
an unlawful forfeiture?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE")
brought this action against appellant Motor Cargo ("Motor
Cargo") to collect on amounts allegedly due TIE under a
Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement - Plan III
("Retro Agreement B") entered into between the parties.

The

parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in the Trial
Court below.

The Trial Court granted TIE'S Motion for Summary

Judgment as to its First Cause of Action, while denying it
Summary Judgment on its Second Cause of Action.

In addition,

the Trial Court denied Motor Cargo's Motion for Summary
Judgment on its Counterclaim, but granted Motor Cargo leave to
amend.

As part of its Order and Judgment, the Trial Court

stayed execution on the Judgment until all remaining claims
asserted by the parties were fully adjudicated.
On the remaining claims and accompanying issues not
resolved by the above Order and Judgment, and pursuant to Rule
39(b) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a
trial was held on stipulated facts, affidavits of the parties,
the Summary Judgment and other memoranda in support of the
various positions of the parties.

The Trial Court thereafter

issued its Memorandum Decision, granting judgment in favor of
TIE on its First and Second Causes of Action, less a partial
setoff by Motor Cargo for credits held by TIE, and dismissing
Motor Cargo's First Cause of Action in its Amended Counterclaim
asserting an excess premium refund of $56,931.00 to which Motor
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Cargo is entitled and which is confirmed by TIE'S own records.
The Trial Court held that this Order and Judgment superseded
its Summary Judgment noted above, and subsequently made and
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings
and Conclusions").
In its Findings and Conclusions, the Trial Court
specifically concluded as a matter of law that Retro Agreement
B was clear and unambiguous and entitled TIE to judgment in the
amount of $68,394.00, plus interest, together with attorneys'
fees in the amount of $14,500.00.

In addition, the Trial Court

made conclusions of law concerning the material provisions in
Retro Agreement B upon which it based its decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Motor Cargo is a Utah trucking company and common

carrier with its principal place of business in North Salt
Lake, Utah.
2.

(R. 24.)
TIE is an insurer in the State of Utah which

specializes in writing insurance policies for common carriers
such as Motor Cargo.
3.

(R. 1.)

Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo and

the terms of an agreement between the parties dated March 1,
1979, designated as "Retrospective Premium Determination
Agreement - Plan III" ("Retro Agreement A " ) , TIE issued its
policy of insurance No. 6120-00-40 (the "Policy") to Motor
Cargo, having an effective date of March 1, 1979.
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(R. 389.)

4.

From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the term of

Retro Agreement A and the Policy, TIE provided insurance
coverage to Motor Cargo.
5.

(R. 390.)

At Motor Cargo's request, the Policy was renewed

for an additional three-year period beginning on March 1, 1982,
and a second Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement Plan III ("Retro Agreement B") was executed by the parties.
Id.

A true and accurate copy of Retro Agreement B is attached

as Exhibit "C" to the Complaint.
6.

(R. 11-14.)

Retro Agreement B, signed by the parties on

March 2, 1982, was identical to Retro Agreement A except for
certain percentage changes in the definition portion of Retro
Agreement B.
7.

(R. 6-9, 11-14.)
The Retro Agreements generally provide for a

basic premium which Motor Cargo was required to pay on a
monthly basis, but which allow adjustments to that premium by
way of additional payments by Motor Cargo or credits or refunds
to Motor Cargo for any excess payments.
8.

Id.

Retrospective rating under the Retro Agreements

provides a method of determining, in retrospect, what the final
earned premium for the Policy will be for the agreed term of
the Policy.

Retrospective rating is designed to benefit an

insured with a good loss experience record.
9.

(R. 391.)

Determining premiums retrospectively in the

manner set forth in the Retro Agreements benefits the insured
by allowing it the option of partial self-insurance, and
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because of the retrospective retention, of achieving broader
insurance coverage at a reduced cost compared to the premium
for similar coverage under a standard policy.
10.

Id.

Paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B clearly

establishes a right in both TIE and Motor Cargo to cancel the
Policy prior to expiration of the term.

Specifically, para-

graph 16(a) provides that if Motor Cargo cancels the Policy,
the premium due TIE "shall be computed in accordance with the
other provisions" of Retro Agreement B, but that at a minimum,
the premium would be 110% of the Retrospective Premium or Basic
Premium, whichever is the greater.
11.

(R. 14.)

Paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B provides, among

other things, that Motor Cargo would be refunded, periodically
throughout the term of the Policy, any excess premium paid to
TIE.

Paragraph 13 in relevant part, states:
ADJUSTMENT OF PREMIUM. After computing the
Retrospective Premium at the 60-day,
6-month, 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month
periods, and provided the Retrospective
Premium for the term of this agreement is
less than all premium paid to the Exchange
upon said policy, the Exchange shall, after
each such computation . . . refund such
excess premium to the Insured at such time
and in the manner requested, . . . .

(R. 13.)

(Emphasis supplied.)
12.

On February 28, 1983, Motor Cargo exercised its

right of cancellation under paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B
by giving written notice to TIE of its intention to cancel all
insurance policies then in effect between Motor Cargo and TIE,
including the Policy.

(R. 15.)
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13.

In accordance with the notice of cancellation,

TIE cancelled the Policy as of February 28, 1983.
14.

(R. 16.)

Following cancellation of the Policy, TIE

submitted a premium report to Motor Cargo dated September 30,
1985 which, in accordance with paragraph 13, showed that Motor
Cargo was entitled to a premium refund of $56,931.00.

A copy

of the premium report is attached as Exhibit "A" to the
Affidavit of William K. Maxwell.
15.

(R. 180.)

Following submission of the premium report to

Motor Cargo, TIE sent Motor Cargo a final invoice showing a
premium due of $68,394.00.

The invoice, however, failed to

credit Motor Cargo for the excess premium refund of $56,931.00
rightfully due Motor Cargo under paragraph 13 and confirmed by
the premium report previously submitted by TIE.

(R. 392-93.)

A copy of the final invoice is attached as Exhibit "G" to the
Affidavit of Paul J. Semons.
16.

(R. 169.)

Motor Cargo took issue with TIE'S calculation of

the premium due under Retro Agreement B.

Thereafter, on

October 12, 1983, TIE filed a Complaint against Motor Cargo to
recover the above amounts allegedly due under the Retro
Agreements.
17.

(R. 1-16.)
Following discovery, the parties filed cross

motions for summary judgment.
18.

(R. 135-72, 173-74, 181-97.)

Following the Trial Court's ruling on the cross

motions for summary judgment, the parties submitted for trial
the resolution of Motor Cargo's First Cause of Action in its
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Amended Counterclaim concerning all premium refunds due to
Motor Cargo under Retro Agreement B.
19.

Following trial, the Trial Court, having reviewed

the stipulated facts,1 affidavits of the parties, memoranda
in support of the various positions of the parties and
arguments of counsel, issued its Memorandum Decision holding
that Retro Agreement B did not entitle Motor Cargo to a premium
refund of $56,931.00 under the Policy.
20.

(R. 335-40.)

Following its decision, the Trial Court entered

its Findings and Conclusions (R. 388-97.)

For the purposes of

this appeal, the following Conclusions of Law are material:
a.
The Court is required to look to the terms
of the contract and their plain meaning on questions
of interpretation. Only when the Court, finds the
contract to be ambiguous or inconsistent may it turn
to the general rules of construction, i.e. favoring
specific provisions over general, first dated provisions over later, and construction against the
scrivener.
b.
Paragraph 4(b) of [Retro Agreement B]
defines the Basic Premium as being 76.42% of the
Standard Premium. Paragraph 4(a) defines the
"Standard Premium" as the premium established in
the Policy.

1

The parties, pursuant to Rule 39(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, entered into a Stipulation on or about
December 16, 1987, basically setting forth the facts stipulated
to for the purpose of the trial. The affidavit, motions, and
memoranda in support of the various positions of the parties
were attached as exhibits to the Stipulation. Due to reasons
unknown by Motor Cargo, the Stipulation, although relied upon
by the Trial Court in making its decision, is not part of the
record on appeal. Thus, Motor Cargo refers the Court to the
Addendum at the end of this brief which incorporates the
Stipulation as part of the record on appeal. See Addendum,
infra.
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c.
Paragraph 4(f) of the Agreement defines
"Retrospective Premium" as:
The earned premium according to this
agreement, computed as the sum of
Incurred Losses, plus Service Fee, plus
Premium Taxes, in no event to exceed
the Standard Premium.
d.
Paragraph 12 of [Retro Agreement B] specifically provides how the Retrospective Premium is to be
computed.
e.
Paragraph 13 of [Retro Agreement B] provides
for adjustments to the premium for any excess premium
under certain circumstances.
f.
Paragraph 16 of [Retro Agreement B]
provides, among other things, that either party may
cancel on thirty (30) days written notice and that the
premium of cancellation prior to the end of the term
shall be computed in accordance with the other
provisions of [Retro Agreement B ] , subject to the
additional provisions in Paragraph 16.
g.
One of the additional provisions of Paragraph 16 provides, in part, that if the insured cancels, the minimum earned premium shall be 110% of the
Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is greater.
h.
[Retro Agreement B] specifically defines
Basic Premium and Retrospective Premium and the manner
of their calculation. Any adjustments thereto provided
in [Retro Agreement B] are not included in the definition of those terms nor in their calculation.
i.
Paragraph 16 specifically makes any manner
of calculation in [Retro Agreement B] subject to the
provisions of subparagraph 16(a) which specifically
establishes the minimum earned premium upon cancellation at 110% of the Retrospective Premium or Basic
Premium, whichever is greater. This paragraph makes
no mention of any adjustments to these calculations,
nor that there is to be a penalty of 10% of any
premium so adjusted.
j.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that [Retro Agreement B] under its terms is
clear and unambiguous and that the earned premium on
cancellation by the insured, Motor Cargo, is equal to
110% of the Basic Premium or Retrospective Premium,
whichever is greater, as calculated pursuant to Para-

-8-

graph 4, subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c); Paragraph
12, and Paragraph 16 of [Retro Agreement B ] .
k.
TIE is entitled to judgment on its Second
Cause of Action against Motor Cargo for the sum of
$13,960.00, i.e. 10% of the Basic Premium of
$139,600.00, less a credit of $16,530.00 due the
defendant as shown on TIE'S final invoice with the
difference between those sums, namely $2,570.00, to be
allowed as a credit against the principal amount of
$70,964.00 awarded against Motor Cargo in the Summary
Judgment dated February 25, 1987, on TIE'S First Cause
of Action, leaving a total principal amount owed by
Motor Cargo to TIE on both causes of action of
$68,394.00.
1.
Because Motor Cargo's amended counterclaim
has been dismissed and it is entitled to recover
nothing thereby or by way of setoff or defenses in
accordance with Paragraph 1 of the Summary Judgment
dated February 25, 1987, TIE is entitled to accruing
interest on the sum of $68,394.00 at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum from February 25, 1988, until
judgment is entered based upon the foregoing Findings
and Conclusions. In addition, and as part of the
judgment, Motor Cargo should be awarded reasonable
attorneys' fees amounting to $14,500.00 and its costs
incurred herein amounting to $60.00.
(R. 393-97.)
21.

(Emphasis supplied).
On February 13, 1989, the Trial Court entered its

Order and Judgment in accordance with its Conclusions of Law.
(R. 398-99.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the case at bar, the Trial Court erred when it
concluded that Retro Agreement B was clear, unambiguous, and
dictated that Motor Cargo was not entitled to an excess premium
refund.

In reaching its decision, the Trial Court incorrectly

relied upon specific provisions while ignoring others, as
opposed to harmonizing all provisions to reach a fair and
equitable result.

Utah courts have clearly established that
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contracts must be construed as a whole and, where possible,
given meaning and effect to all provisions.

Specifically, the

Trial Court failed to give due effect to paragraph 13 of Retro
Agreement B which specifically provides Motor Cargo with a
right to a premium refund if revealed by an audit conducted by
TIE periodically during the term of the Policy.

There is no

language anywhere in Retro Agreement B specifically excluding
Motor Cargo's right to an excess premium refund in the event of
cancellation by Motor Cargo.

Moreover, Motor Cargo's own

records reveal an excess premium refund due Motor Cargo in the
amount of $56,931.00.

Based on the Trial Court's errant

interpretation of Retro Agreement B and its failure to apply
fundamental rules of construction, Motor Cargo was wrongfully
denied an excess premium refund clearly and unequivocally
called for by paragraph 13.
In the alternative, the Trial Court's interpretation
of Retro Agreement B recognized an ambiguity concerning the
interplay and relationship between paragraphs 16 and 13 in the
event of cancellation by Motor Cargo.

Utah courts construe

ambiguities in insurance contracts strictly against the insurer
and liberally in favor of the insured.

Thus, the Trial Court

further erred when it resolved any ambiguities in paragraphs 16
and 13 in favor of TIE.
Finally, the Trial Court erred when it concluded that
Motor Cargo's denial of a refund did not constitute an unlawful
forfeiture.

Utah courts recognize that a contract cannot be
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construed to require a forfeiture unless such a result is clear
and unequivocally demanded by the terms of the contract.

Retro

Agreement B does not contain or even purport to contain a
"clear and unequivocal" forfeiture clause denying Motor Cargo's
right to an excess premium refund upon cancellation.

The Trial

Court's decision has resulted in a harsh and inequitable
forfeiture of Motor Cargo's premium refund while unjustly
awarding TIE with a windfall.

It is clear that in the event of

cancellation under Retro Agreement B, the reasonable
expectations of the parties did not encompass a waiver of Motor
Cargo's right to an excess premium refund.
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
reverse the Trial Court's judgment denying Motor Cargo's First
Cause of Action in its Amended Counterclaim and credit Motor
Cargo with a setoff in the amount of $56,931.00.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE FULL
EFFECT AND MEANING TO ALL PROVISIONS IN
RETRO AGREEMENT B.
A.

This Appeal Presents a Question of
Law Concerning the Interpretation
of a Contract. Thus, This Court
Must Make its Own Independent
Interpretation of Retro Agreement
B and Accord No Deference to the
Trial Court's Interpretation.

In its final analysis, the Trial Court interpreted
Retro Agreement B as a matter of law, without reference to or
reliance upon any extrinsic evidence.

Consequently, this Court

should not accord any particular weight or deference to the
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Trial Court's interpretation.

Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick

Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986); Jones v.
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Utah App.
1987); Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279,
283 (Utah App. 1987).

This Court should instead "make its own

independent interpretation of the contract terms."

Big

Cottonwood Tanner, 740 P.2d at 1359 (guoting Jones v. Hinkle,
611 P.2d at 735); see also Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d
1149, 1150 (Utah 1986).

Applying the above standard of review

to the case at bar, this Court must make its own independent
interpretation and construction of Retro Agreement B in order
to determine the correctness of the Trial Court's decision
below.
B.

The Trial Court Ignored the Plain
Meaning of Retro Agreement B When
it Held That Paragraph 13 Did Not
Apply in the Event of Cancellation
by Motor Cargo.

In its Findings and Conclusions, the Trial Court
specifically relied upon paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), 4(f), 12, and
13 of Retro Agreement B in support of its decision. (R. 394-95.)
Specifically, the Trial Court held that calculation of the
premium under paragraph 16 only required the application of
paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 12, and paid mere "lip service" to
paragraph 13.

(R. 394-95.)

Initially, it must be noted that the Trial Court
committed a fundamental error when it held that it would apply
general rules of construction concerning contracts "[o]nly when
-12-

the Court finds the contract to be ambiguous or inconsistent."
(R. 393.)

Utah case law dictates otherwise.

Notwithstanding

the absence of an ambiguity in a contract, Utah courts observe
and apply the following general rules of construction: (1)
insurance contracts should generally be construed as a whole
without ignoring any specific parts thereof, Fuller v. Director
of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1985); see also Minshew
v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978); Big
Cottonwood Tanner, 740 P.2d at 1359, and (2) all provisions in
an insurance contract should be given proper effect and
meaning, including the consideration of each provision in
connection with the others.

Fuller, 694 P.2d at 1048; Chevron

Oil, 575 P.2d at 194; Big Cottonwood Tanner, 740 P.2d at 1359;
see also Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d at 735.
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it
failed to follow the fundamental rules of construction noted
above in interpreting Retro Agreement B.

A proper application

of these rules dictates giving full meaning and effect to paragraph 13,2 something the Trial Court simply chose not to do.

2

Paragraph 13 in relevant part, states:
ADJUSTMENT OF PREMIUM. After computing the Retrospective
Premium at the 60-day, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, and
36-month periods, and provided the Retrospective Premium
for the term of this agreement is less than all premium
paid to the Exchange upon said policy, the Exchange shall,
after each such computation . . . refund such excess
premium to the Insured at such time and in the manner
requested, . . . ."

(R. 13.)

(Emphasis supplied.)
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The language of paragraph 16 in Retro Agreement B
specifically makes reference, without qualification, to all
other premium computation provisions found in the agreement.
Paragraph 16 in relevant part, states:
CANCELLATION. This agreement may be cancelled by the Insured, or by the Exchange,
at any time, by giving thirty days (30)
advance written notice to the other party.
The Exchange may cancel the agreement because of non-payment of premium by giving
ten days (10) advance written notice to the
Insured. The premium for a cancellation
prior to the end of the term of this agreement shall be computed in accordance with
the other provisions of this agreement,
subject to the following additional provisions .
(a) Cancellation by the named Insured:
In event of cancellation by the named
Insured for any other reason, the
minimum earned premium shall be 110% of
the Retrospective or Basic Premium,
whichever is the greater, but the
amount so calculated shall not exceed
the Standard Premium as defined in this
agreement; . . .
(R. 14.)

(Emphasis added.)

As paragraph 16 indicates, the

premium in the event of cancellation by the insured shall be
computed "in accordance with the other provisions of this
agreement, subject to the following additional provisions."
Id.

Thus, when determining the amount of a premium in the

event of cancellation by the insured, the insurer must consider
and apply all other premium computation provisions of the
agreement, including paragraph 13, subject to the minimum
earned premium amount set forth in paragraph 16(a).
Trial Court clearly failed to do.
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This the

Paragraph 16 does not

contain any language explicitly or implicitly excluding
application of the excess premium refund provision of paragraph
13 upon cancellation by the insured.

Indeed, TIE incorporated

paragraph 13 into paragraph 16 by drafting a general reference
to the "other provisions" of the agreement.

TIE now attempts

to turn its back on this language in order to avoid paying an
excess premium refund rightfully due Motor Cargo.
As correctly noted by the Trial Court in its
Conclusions of Law, courts are "required to look to the terms
of the contract and their plain meaning on questions of
interpretation."

(R. 393.)

(Emphasis added.)

In construing

paragraph 16, the Trial Court was called upon to interpret the
plain meaning of the phrase "other provisions of this
agreement."

In determining the plain meaning of terms used in

an insurance contract, Utah courts have relied upon Webster's
dictionary as a primary source.

See/ e.g., Fuller v. Director

of Finance, 694 P.2d at 1047 (defining "damages"); Hoffman v.
Life Insurance Company Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 416
(Utah 1983) (defining "expect").

The term "other," as used in

paragraph 16, is defined by Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary, p. 835 (1988) as "being the other one or ones
distinct from that or those first mentioned or implied."

Based

on this definition, it is apparent that the parties intended
and reasonably expected the phrase "other provisions of this
agreement" in paragraph 16 to be broad and expansive to include
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paragraph 13, as opposed to the narrow and selective interpretation given by the Trial Court.
Paragraph 13 clearly applies to the insurer's
computation of the premium during periodic times throughout the
term of the Policy, including 12 months after the renewal date,
which is exactly what transpired in the present action.3

In

direct contravention to the express language of paragraph 16
and fundamental rules of construction, the Trial Court
selectively applied the computation provisions of paragraphs
4(a), 4(b), 4(f), and 12, while paying mere "lip service" to
paragraph 13, when determining the correct amount of the
premium.

The Trial Court's Conclusion of Law that the premium

refund provision of paragraph 13 had application only "under
certain circumstances" avoids the gravamen of this appeal to
determine specifically under what circumstances paragraph 13
applies, which Motor Cargo contends includes cancellation under
paragraph 16.

The Trial Court's failure to thoroughly analyze

those "circumstances" and apply them to the case at bar
provides no guidance to this Court on appeal.

(R. 394.)

It is clearly established that Motor Cargo, in strict
accordance with the cancellation procedure set forth in para-

3

Paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B clearly dictates that, at
specific time periods throughout the term of the Policy, TIE is
obligated to refund any excess premium previously paid by Motor
Cargo. Paragraph 13 does not contain any language expressly or
implicitly negating its application in the event of cancellation by Motor Cargo. To the contrary, the express language of
paragraph 13 mandates that TIE is obligated to refund to Motor
Cargo, 12 months into the term of the Policy, for any excess
premium due.
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graph 16, terminated the Policy 12 months after it had been
extended.

(R. 392,)

Thus, in accordance with paragraph 13,

Motor Cargo was entitled to an excess premium refund, if any,
at the end of the 12-month period.

As the record below clearly

demonstrates, TIE submitted a premium report to Motor Cargo
which reflected an excess premium due Motor Cargo in the amount
of $56/931.00.

(R. 180.)

As such, Motor Cargo was clearly

entitled to a setoff in the amount of $56,931.00 against any
sums owed to TIE as a result of cancellation.
Moreover, paragraph 16 likewise does not contain any
language expressly or implicitly negating the application of
paragraph 13 in the event of cancellation by Motor Cargo.4
In fact, paragraph 16, as discussed above, makes a general
reference to paragraph 13.

The Trial Court's holding that

cancellation by Motor Cargo under paragraph 16 waives any right
to a refund under paragraph 13, in effect, takes away Motor
Cargo's freedom of choice under paragraph 16 to cancel the
Policy.

That is, Motor Cargo's choice of cancelling the Policy

4

In its Conclusions of Law, the Trial Court, in support of
its conclusion that paragraph 13 had no application upon
cancellation by Motor Cargo, noted that paragraph 16 "makes no
mention of any adjustments to these calculations, nor that
there is a penalty of 10% of any premium so adjusted." (R.
395.) This conclusion is a non-sequitur. The absence of any
language in paragraph 16 expressly negating application of
paragraph 13 in the event of cancellation does not override
paragraph 16's express reference to "other provisions" in Retro
Agreement B in computing the premium upon cancellation. The
Trial Court's conclusion has the effect of negating an express
provision through implication, a principle which Motor Cargo
contends is both illogical and lacking in case support.
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and consequently waiving any right to an excess premium refund
is really no choice at all, leaving insureds such as Motor
Cargo effectively "locked in" throughout the term of the
Policy.

Such an interpretation of paragraph 16 is nonsensical

and well beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties.
Moreover, this interpretation unjustly awards the insurer with
a windfall upon cancellation by the insured.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that
paragraphs 16 and 13 were intended by the parties to operate in
conjunction with each other.

That is, paragraph 13, where an

excess premium is revealed, must be applied when determining
the earned premium under paragraph 16.

The parties clearly did

not intend that cancellation under paragraph 16 waives all
rights under paragraph 13 as adopted by the Trial Court.
Indeed, TIE'S own premium report sent to Motor Cargo showed an
excess premium of $56,931.00 paid by Motor Cargo.

The

interpretation of paragraphs 16 and 13 forwarded by TIE and
accepted by the Trial Court below are patently disingenuous and
should be rejected by this Court.
II.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RETRO AGREEMENT B
PRESENTED THE TRIAL COURT WITH AN
AMBIGUITY WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONSTRUED AGAINST ITS DRAFTER, TIE.

At worst, the Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions
acknowledges an ambiguity concerning the interplay of
paragraphs 13 and 16 in the event of cancellation by Motor
Cargo which must be construed strictly against TIE as the
drafter of Retro Agreement B and liberally in favor of Motor
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Cargo as the insured.

Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479; see

also Utah Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Orville Andrews & Sons,
665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983) (affirming summary judgment in
favor of an insured against its insurer).

Utah courts have

found the above doctrine particularly applicable to the
interpretation of insurance contracts, Utah Farm Bureau, 665
P.2d at 1309, and where the ambiguity could have easily been
avoided.

Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479 (drafter could have

avoided ambiguity by simply adding an additional phrase to the
provision in dispute).
A.

Paragraph 16 is Ambiguous in That
it Fails to Define What is Meant
by the Phrase "Computed in Accordance with the Other Provisions of
This Agreement, Subject to the
Following Additional Provisions."

In order to uphold the Trial Court's decision denying
Motor Cargo's Counterclaim, this Court must find that, in the
event of cancellation by the insured, the language of paragraph
16 clearly and unequivocally negates the application of paragraph 13 in computing the earned premium.

As discussed above,

there is no language anywhere in paragraphs 13, 16, or any
other provision in the agreement to such effect.

Thus, it is

arguably ambiguous as to what is meant by "other provisions" as
used in paragraph 16.

See supra, quoting paragraph 16, p. 14.

Moreover, it is equally unclear what is meant by the phrase
"subject to the following additional provisions" as used in
paragraph 16.

_Id.

The Trial Court below apparently con-

strued the above language to mean that paragraph 13 would apply
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only "under certain circumstances."

(R. 394.)

However, the

Trial Court failed to define what "circumstances" required the
application of paragraph 13.

It is thus unclear from the

Conclusions of Law made by the Trial Court below concerning the
application of paragraph 13 in the event of cancellation under
paragraph 16.
As noted above, the principle of construing a contract
against its scrivener in the event of an ambiguity is appropriately applied where the ambiguity could have easily been
avoided.

Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479.

In the case at

bar, TIE could have easily avoided any ambiguity raised by the
terms "other" and "subject to" in paragraph 16 by simply
inserting additional language which would have clearly put
Motor Cargo on notice of the inapplicability of paragraph 13 in
the event of cancellation by Motor Cargo.5

TIE'S failure to

do so, however, must result in construing the above ambiguities
in favor of Motor Cargo and against TIE as drafter of Retro
Agreement B.

Accordingly, upon written cancellation of the

Policy by Motor Cargo, TIE should have applied paragraph 13
when computing the earned premium.

5

For example, TIE could have easily inserted the following
provision at the end of Paragraph 13: "The Insured waives its
right to receive a credit or refund of any excess premium when
it elects to cancel the policy pursuant to the cancellation
provisions of paragraph 16." In addition, TIE could have easily
inserted the following provision at the end of the first complete paragraph of paragraph 16: "However, the Insured is advised that in the event it exercises its right of cancellation
under this Policy, it specifically waives its right to receive
a credit or refund of any excess premium, as provided for under
paragraph 13."
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In summary, the Trial Court failed to give full effect
and meaning to paragraph 13 when determining the proper earned
premium amount under Retro Agreement B.

There is no express

language in paragraphs 13, 16 or any other provision expressly
or implicitly negating Motor Cargo's right to receive a refund
of excess premiums paid under the Policy.

In the alternative,

paragraphs 13 and 16 create an ambiguity which must be construed
against TIE resulting in a premium refund to Motor Cargo.

Under

both the clear and unambiguous language of Retro Agreement B or
in the event of an ambiguity, Motor Cargo is entitled to a
reversal of the Trial Court's ruling against it on its
counterclaim to recover the excess premium paid under Retro
Agreement B.
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE MOTOR
CARGO'S DENIAL OF EXCESS PREMIUMS DUE
AN UNLAWFUL FORFEITURE.
A.

The Trial Court Failed to Rule on
Whether TIE 's Denial of an Excess
Premium Ref und Const:ituted a
Forfeiture Under Ret:ro Agreement B

In its Findings and Conclusions, the Trial Court did
not resolve the issue of whether or not, as a matter of law,
TIE'S denial to Motor Cargo of an excess premium refund
constituted an unlawful forfeiture.

Thus, this Court should

apply the same standard of review accorded to the Trial Court's
ruling on the interpretation of Retro Agreement B.

That is,

this Court must make its own independent interpretation as to
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whether or not the acts taken by TIE in the case at bar
constituted an unlawful and unconscionable forfeiture.6
B„

Utah Courts Have Consistently Held
That Forfeitures Should Not be
Declared Unless Such a Result is
Called For by the Clear and
Unequivocal Language in the
Contract.

As a general rule, "[f]orfeitures are not favored, and
in interpreting an agreement, every reasonable presumption
should be indulged against an intention to allow a forfeiture."
Green v. Palfreyman, 166 P.2d 215, 219, reh'g denied, opinion
amended on other grounds, 175 P.2d 213 (Utah 1946) (emphasis
supplied).

Moreover, Utah courts have consistently held that a

forfeiture should not be enforced unless the terms of an
agreement are clear and unequivocal.

Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters,

28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah 1972); First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah
1983).

Finally, the courts have held that "where there is a

choice, an interpretation which will bring about an equitable
result will be preferred over a harsh or inequitable one."
Wingets, 500 P.2d at 1010 (footnote omitted).

Application of

the above principles to the case at bar clearly dictates a

6

The Utah Supreme Court has defined "forfeiture" as "the
involuntary or forced loss of [a] right, caused by the failure
of the appropriator or owner to do or perform some act."
Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 894, 900 (Utah 1937). In the case
at bar, Motor Cargo's involuntary relinquishment of its right
to an excess premium refund purportedly caused by its early
cancellation under paragraph 16 constituted a "forfeiture" as
defined in Hammond.
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reversal of the Trial Court's denial of Motor Cargo1s motion
for summary judgment on its Amended Counterclaim.
C.

The Clear and Unambiguous Language
of Retro Agreement B Does Not Call
for Forfeiture of Motor Cargo's
Premium Refund to Which it was
Entitled.

As discussed above in Section I.B., the clear and
unequivocal language of paragraphs 16 and 13 of Retro Agreement
B called for an excess premium refund to Motor Cargo under the
agreement.

Conversely, it is clear that paragraphs 16 and 13

do not "clearly and unequivocally" negate an insured's right to
an excess premium refund in the event of cancellation under the
agreement.

Moreover, the clear and unambiguous language of

paragraphs 13 and 16 do not call for a forfeiture under the
instant facts or under any other circumstances.

Following the

strong policy enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Green
disfavoring forfeitures, it must reasonably be presumed that in
light of paragraphs 16 and 13, the parties did not intend to
allow a forfeiture in the event of cancellation of the Policy
by Motor Cargo.
TIE seeks this Court's affirmance of the harsh, inequitable forfeiture taken against Motor Cargo.

Notwithstanding

its retention of the excess premiums due Motor Cargo, TIE has
been reimbursed for all of its out-of-pocket expenses and
allocated overhead, including a ten percent (10%) penalty in
the amount of $13,960.00.

(R. 169.)

Yet, notwithstanding

TIE'S recouping of its expenses, contractual profits, and an
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additional penalty of nearly $14,000.00, TIE continues to
wrongfully retain the $56,931.00 in excess premiums which its
own records show was overpaid by Motor Cargo.

(R. 180.)

In

other words, TIE seeks affirmance of the Trial Court's improper
and unlawful awarding of a windfall to TIE.

A denial to Motor

Cargo of the excess premium to which it is rightfully entitled
under Retro Agreement B is unjustly harsh and flies in the face
of the clear and unambiguous language of paragraphs 16 and 13,
as well as strong public policy recognized in Utah disfavoring
forfeitures.
In summary, the clear and unequivocal language of
Retro Agreement B does not dictate a waiver of Motor Cargo's
right to an excess premium refund.

TIE has clearly received

all of its out-of-pocket expenses, plus an additional penalty
assessed against Motor Cargo.

Motor Cargo is thus entitled to

a reversal of the Trial Court with respect to its Amended
Counterclaim.

An affirmance of the Trial Court would not only

cut against the clear and express language of Retro Agreement B
and the law of forfeitures, but would additionally provide TIE
with an undeserved windfall.

The parties never envisioned such

a harsh and inequitable result at the time the agreement was
entered.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court below clearly erred when it failed to
give due meaning and effect to the premium refund provision of
paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B.
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Consequently, the Trial

Court wrongfully awarded TIE, in addition to its out-of-pocket
expenses and a profit, the excess premium refund rightfully due
Motor Cargo.

There is no "clear and unequivocal" language in

paragraphs 13, 16, or any other provision in Retro Agreement B
authorizing this harsh and inequitable forfeiture against Motor
Cargo.

Moreover, Utah case law prohibits forfeitures under

similar circumstances.

Based on the clear and unambiguous

language of Retro Agreement B, it is apparent that the
reasonable expectations of the parties did not encompass a
forfeiture in the event of cancellation by Motor Cargo.
Even assuming the existence of an ambiguity raise by
paragraphs 13 and 16, the agreement should be construed against
TIE as scrivener, resulting in an excess premium refund to
Motor Cargo.

TIE could have easily inserted language in both

paragraphs 13 and 16 which would have clearly put Motor Cargo
on notice of its limited rights in the event of cancellation.
However, TIE failed to do so.
Based on the foregoing, Motor Cargo respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court's denial of
its counterclaim and enter judgment entitling Motor Cargo to
the excess premium refund wrongfully retained by TIE.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of May, 1989.

Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Motor Cargo, through this Addendum, submits the
attached Stipulation entered into between the parties on or
about December 16, 1987.

Due to reasons unknown by Motor

Cargo, the Stipulation, although relied upon by the Trial Court
below in rendering its decision, is not part of the record on
appeal.

Thus, Motor Cargo submits the following Stipulation as

part of the record on appeal.
As part of the Stipulation, the parties attached as
exhibits all affidavits, motions and memoranda in support of
the various positions of the parties.

All of the aforemen-

tioned documents are currently part of the record on appeal.
Thus, in order to avoid redundancy, the exhibits are not
submitted as part of the Stipulation.

-26-

GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX
& BENDINGER
Jay D. Gurmankin
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
corporation,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION

v.
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. 34602

Defendant,

The plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE"), by
and through its attorneys of record, Mazuran, Verhaaren &
Hayes, P.C., and the defendant, Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation
("Motor Cargo"), by and through its attorneys of record,
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger, herewith stipulate and
agree as follows:
1.

The issues in this proceeding not heretofore

resolved by the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February
25, 1987, other than Motor Cargo's claims for trade liable and
interference with contract and business advantage, are herewith

submitted to the Court for trial and judgment pursuant to Rules
39(b) and 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon the
Motions, Memoranda and Affidavits supporting and opposing
summary judgment previously submitted, and upon the facts
stipulated below.

For the Court's convenience, said Motions,

Memoranda and Affidavits, and the Judgment and Order of the
Court, are attached hereto and incorporated herein as

Exhibits

M W

A _ through _"NH.
2.

Motor Cargo's claims for trade liable and

interference with contract and business advantages are severed
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and trial on
those claims is hereby deferred to a date to be set in the
future.
3.

The following facts are stipulated for the

purposes of trial and the Court is to determine the other facts
based on the memoranda, affidavits and exhibits previously
referred to:
(a)

TIE is and at all times material to its

Complaint in this matter was duly licensed to conduct the
business of an insurer in the State of Utah.
(b)

Motor Cargo at all times material to TIE'S

Complaint maintained its principal place of business in North
Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah.
(c)

Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo

and the terms of an agreement between the parties dated
March 1, 1979, designated as "Retrospective Premium
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Determination Agreement —

Plan III" ("Retro-Agreement—A"),

TIE issued its policy of insurance No, 6120-00-40 (the
"Policy-) to Motor Cargo having an effective date of March 1,
1979.

A copy of Retro Agreement—A is attached hereto as

Exhibit "0".
(d)

From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the

term of Retro Agreement—A and the Policy, the plaintiff
provided insurance coverage for Motor Cargo.
(e)

At the request of Motor Cargo, the Policy

was renewed for an additional three-year period beginning on
March 1, 1982 and a second Retrospective Premium Determination
Agreement—Plan III ("Retro Agreement—B") was executed by the
parties.

A copy of Retro Agreement—B is attached hereto as

Exhibit "P H .
(f)

One year later, on or about February 28,

1983, Motor Cargo gave the plaintiff written notice to cancel
all insurance policies then in effect between Motor Cargo and
TIE, including the Policy.
(g)

In accordance with Motor Cargo's Notice of

Cancellation, TIE cancelled the Policy effective February 28,
1983.
(h)

A copy of the final "Retrospective Premium

Reports" dated September 30, 1985 is attached hereto as Exhibit
"Q" .
4.

Attorneys' Fees, if any are awarded by the Court,

may be proved in accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of
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Practice of this Court, or in such other manner as the Court
may order•
Dated this

^
day of December, 1987.
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C.

irola C.KVerhaaren
Attorneys for Plaintiff
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX
& BENDINGER

By
>y/D ./Gurmankm
Jaj
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage
prepaid thereon, this 25th day of May, 1989, to the following:
Harold C. Verhaaren
Mark F. Bell
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C.
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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